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a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
We  develop  a novel, mixed  methods  approach  to examine  the  relationship  between  political  ideology
and  support  for renewable  energy  and  energy  efﬁciency  (REEE)  policies.  Through  qualitative  analysis  of
interviews  with  state-government  legislators  in  the  U.S.,  we show  that when  legislators  evaluate  and
justify  their  support  for and  opposition  to different  types  of renewable  energy  and  energy  efﬁciency
(REEE)  policies,  they distinguish  bills  based  on frames  that  are  related  to  ideological  differences  (e.g.,  tax
decreases,  government  efﬁciency,  regulation,  mandates,  government  spending).  In turn  the qualitative
distinctions  among  bills  are  associated  with  quantitative  differences  in  levels  of support  and  success  for
the  policies.  Using  data from  a longitudinal  analysis  of  188  major  state-government  laws  passed  from
2004  to 2014  and  a cross-sectional  set  of  709 passed  and  unpassed  laws  from  2011  to  2012,  we show  thatolitical ideology REEE  policies  conﬁgured  as  mandates  (e.g.,  renewable  portfolio  standards)  have  consistently  lower  levels
of support  than for similar  REEE  policies  conﬁgured  as  tax  reductions,  reduction  of  government  waste  by
increasing  building  efﬁciency,  authorization  of  local  government  action,  and  regulatory  reduction.  Thus,
via  both  quantitative  and  qualitative  analysis,  we show  that  there  are  important  ideology-associated
differences  in  REEE  policy  that  point  to opportunities  for more  successful  policy  design.
©  2015  The  Authors.  Published  by  Elsevier  Ltd. This  is an  open  access  article  under  the CC  BY-NC-ND. Introduction
Although there have been multiple opportunities since 1990 for
he world’s political leaders to develop policies that would slow or
educe greenhouse gas emissions, the resulting policy reforms to
ate have fallen far short of targets suggested as necessary by cli-
ate science. Such policy failures suggest that an important task of
ocial science is to understand the conditions under which gov-
rnments do and do not respond to environmental and energy
roblems. The politics of energy governance is now recognized
s an important area of research in the social science of energy
1,2]. We  argue that a better understanding of political ideology is
n important resource for developing a theory of environmental-
nergy reform and for understanding the practical problem of
rafting policy to increase its likelihood of gaining broad political
upport.
∗ Corresponding author. Fax: +1 615-322-7505.
E-mail addresses: david.j.hess@vanderbilt.edu (D.J. Hess),
uan.d.mai@vanderbilt.edu (Q.D. Mai), kate.pridebrown@vanderbilt.edu
K.P. Brown).
1 Fax: +1 615-322-7505
ttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2015.08.007
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This study focuses on the U.S., where ideological differences
with respect to energy policy are currently pronounced. Because
the U.S. is a continental country with widespread variation at the
state government level on this issue, the scope of the analysis is
similar to other “international” studies, such as comparisons across
European countries. An important dimension of this variation in the
U.S. is the difference between “red” (or conservative) and “blue” (or
progressive, also described as “liberal”) states and state legislators.
These differences refer to a range of issues, but one of the central
divisions involves ideological disagreements over the proper role
of government intervention in the economy.
These differences have international implications, not only
because of the inﬂuence of the U.S. globally but also because
of the importance of similar ideological divisions in other coun-
tries. Fundamental political differences have increasingly affected
energy policy aimed at greenhouse gas reduction, especially in the
Anglophone world such as Australia and Canada [3]. More broadly,
neoliberal ideology is now inﬂuential across a wide range of coun-
tries, where market-oriented preferences can be used to justify
inaction on decarbonization policies.We  argue that attention to the speciﬁc connections between
ideology and types of renewable energy and energy efﬁciency
(REEE) legislation can provide insights into the problem of under-
standing the politics that underline energy policy [1]. Speciﬁcally,
under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.

























































s0 D.J. Hess et al. / Energy Researc
e examine how various frames associated with conservative
deology—e.g., support for tax cuts and deregulation, opposition to
overnment mandates and cost increases, and support for business
evelopment—are both explicit points of reference in the discourse
f state legislators and are quantitatively associated with differen-
ial support for REEE laws in state legislatures.
Although the focus of this study is on REEE legislation in state
overnments in the U.S., we use this speciﬁc research problem
o develop a broader contribution to the analysis of the political
onditions of environmental and energy reform. In terms of the
5 research questions outlined by Sovacool [1] as central for the
nergy research and social science ﬁeld, we utilize a mixed meth-
ds approach (questions 1–5) that enables an analysis of ideology
nd framing (questions 5–10) to develop a better understanding of
he underlying principles of energy governance (question 56).
. Theoretical and policy background: ideology and the
ociology of environmental reform
.1. Theoretical background
This study contributes to the interdisciplinary ﬁeld of the social
cience of energy policy with a focus on environmental sociology.
he sociology of environmental and energy reform can be divided
nto the study of the conditions that shape changes in policy and
ractices (e.g., [4]) and the evaluation of the effectiveness of such
hanges in ameliorating environmental and social problems (e.g.,
5,6]). Although the focus of this project is on the ﬁrst of the two
reas (the conditions that affect reform), we assume that research
n the second problem area shows that policy reforms are often
ess effective at solving environmental problems than originally
nvisioned [7].
Previous research has documented several clusters of important
onditions that affect the opportunities for reform, among them the
ole of interests, such as the mobilization of social movements [8,9]
nd the extent to which industries are divided and accustomed
o regulatory intervention [10]; and the role of institutions, such
s diffusion dynamics and institutional isomorphism, including
or renewable portfolio standards [11,12], and variance in govern-
ent structure, such as the strength of the executive appointment
owers over government agencies [13]. Our focus is on another
mportant factor: the role of ideology, which is frequently a strong
r even the strongest predictor of attitudes and outcomes related to
nvironmental issues. Ideology has been linked to the perception
f threat to catastrophic change [14], attitudes toward government
pending on environmental protection [15], and REEE policy adop-
ion [11,16–18].
Our contribution to this literature is to examine variation in the
evel of support across REEE policy types from the perspective of
deology. Unlike some of the studies in political science and policy,
e do not treat ideology as a single variable (such as a measure of
itizen ideology) and then use it in a multivariate model to predict
olicy adoption. Instead, we are interested in how policy design
istinctions are related to meaningful ideological distinctions that
n turn inform how legislators view, evaluate, and support different
ypes of REEE policy. Recent research has shown that political dif-
erences over environmental policy vary across issue type and may
uctuate over time [19], and in a study of the California legisla-
ure it was shown that differences between types of green-energy
aws are related to ideological differences [20]. However, to date
o research has explored the connection between ideology and
EEE policy type in a systematic way across a broad range of REEE
olicies.
The concept “political ideology” is understood here as a broad
ystem of models of and for action that informs both politicalocial Science 11 (2016) 19–28
attitudes and policy adoption and implementation [21]. An ideol-
ogy becomes meaningful through its contrastive relationship with
other ideologies. In the U.S. and many other advanced industrial
countries, the primary ideological opposition is between “con-
servatism,” which prefers market-based policy instruments when
necessary and low government regulation of markets where pos-
sible, and “liberalism,” which focuses on the role of government
in remedying market imperfections related to inequality, unem-
ployment, environmental destruction, health, and safety. Other
ideologies are important in some circumstances (such as devel-
opmentalism and socialism), but our focus here will be on the
right-left contrast that is described in the U.S. as conservative
versus liberal ideology. As we will show in the qualitative analy-
sis, these conﬂicts are often explicit points of reference in debates
over the proper role of government with respect to markets and
energy reform.
Unlike an approach to ideology that keeps in it a “black box” as
either a binary variable of conservative versus liberal or as a con-
tinuous variable, we develop a more ﬁne-grained approach to the
study of ideology and legislation by using the concept of frames that
can be attached to policy differences. Frames are related to ideol-
ogy as “innovative ampliﬁcations and extensions of, or antidotes to,
existing ideologies or components of them” [22,23], but frames also
serve as meta-communicative signals to allow actors to understand
what “game” they are in, such as cooperation versus conﬂict [24].
Thus, we treat ideology as a broad system of meaning (e.g., conser-
vatism) that includes a variety of frames (e.g., reduce government
spending, reduce regulation, cut taxes) that actors use to evaluate
and negotiate policy proposals. In turn, the use of frames and ide-
ologies is part of a strategic political process of producing coalitions
among actors in order to affect political outcomes [25,26]. Articu-
lating a frame is a social process that requires ampliﬁcation and
communication, as our interviews of state legislators show.
To develop this approach of the analysis of ideologies, frames,
and policy types, we  use a mixed-methods approach. This strat-
egy allows us to show how legislators draw on and articulate the
frames as they evaluate, criticize, or defend bills. It also allows us to
develop hypotheses about potential differences in the level of sup-
port within the REEE policy ﬁeld across different policy designs.
This approach has the beneﬁt of providing a novel theoretical con-
tribution to the analysis of ideology and policy outcomes and of
offering potential practical insight into the problem of building
broad political support for REEE legislation.
2.2. Ideology and conﬂict in the REEE policy ﬁeld
There is a documented tendency for attitudes toward environ-
mental policy to become more polarized in the U.S. especially after
1990 [15]. In turn, the polarization on environmental policies is
part of a broader political polarization on a range of issues [27,28].
In addition to issue polarization, there is also a trend for both
houses of a state legislature to be controlled increasingly by one
party [29]. This party polarization became especially pronounced
after the 2014 elections, when the number of partisan state legis-
latures controlled by Republicans reached 68 out of 98, the highest
level in the party’s history [30]. In 24 states Republicans controlled
both houses of the legislature and the governor’s ofﬁce, whereas
Democrats had complete control of the three bodies in only six
states [30]. The increasing control of legislatures by Republicans,
and the inﬂuence of the conservative “Tea Party” wing within that
party, has coincided with issue polarization in the legislatures with
respect to REEE.At the state government level, by 2015 the conservative Amer-
ican Legislative Exchange Council included about one-quarter of
state legislators among its members [31]. ALEC has worked with
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nergy and energy efﬁciency portfolio standards (REEPS) and net
etering. A report on state government legislation in 2013 indi-
ated that 26 of 121 bills for REEPS called for their roll-back, and
he report attributed the support for roll-backs to ALEC-inspired
egislation [32]. In some cases modiﬁcations of the standards also
eakened support for solar and wind energy, for example by adding
arge hydropower in Connecticut (SB 1138, 2013) or waste heat in
hio (SB 315, 2012).1
Although state legislatures rejected many of the attempts to roll-
ack or weaken REEE laws, there are several examples of successful
oll-backs. In 2008 the Ohio legislature approved a sweeping law
n support of REEE policies (SB 221) with strong bipartisan support,
ut in 2014 the new legislature approved a law to freeze the state’s
lternative portfolio standard (SB 310) with sharply divided votes.
imilar reversals occurred in other states, including Kansas, North
arolina, and West Virginia. Furthermore, state legislatures and
overnors have also restricted previous efforts to require environ-
ental certiﬁcation of public building construction and renovation
usually to protect local timber and plastic industries), and they
ave also allowed utilities to weaken net metering programs by
harging additional fees.
In this context, a simplistic analysis would be to portray the
onﬂicts over REEE in state governments as follows: conserva-
ives, mainly on the right wing of the Republican Party, oppose all
EEE policies and are following cues from the utilities and fossil-
uel industries; whereas liberals on the left wing of Democratic
arty support all REEE policies, including those that involve strong
overnment mandates, and support a position in line with environ-
entalists. This formula provides a rough map  of American politics
ith respect to REEE policy especially since the election of Presi-
ent Obama in 2008, but in this study we develop a more nuanced
ortrayal of the relations between conservative and liberal ideology
n the REEE policy ﬁeld.
To provide one example of how the political landscape for REEE
egislation may  be more complicated than a simple party polariza-
ion model would predict, Table 1 shows examples of REEE laws
pproved in 2013 and 2014 in all-Republican state legislatures as
ecorded in the Advanced Energy Legislation Tracker of the Center
or the New Energy Economy of Colorado State University (for all
tates with Republican control of the legislature, N = 24). This “red
tates, green laws” phenomenon suggests the need for a nuanced
nalysis of support for, and opposition to, REEE policy. As a starting
oint, we note the absence of any laws supportive of REEPS and car-
on emissions trading; thus, there is prima facie evidence that some
ypes of laws have become non-starters in Republican-controlled
tates, but opportunities still exist for other types of REEE laws
hat can appeal to conservatives of both parties and to Republican-
ominated state legislatures. This study will map  out what those
pportunities are.
.3. Hypotheses
We  argue that although there is powerful opposition to broad
olicy reforms that would hasten a transition toward greater
eliance on REEE, it is possible to design policy in a way  that
educes the potential for legislative bills to trigger frames con-
ected to fundamental ideological disagreements. We therefore
est the proposition that REEE bills can be classiﬁed in terms of
rames that are linked to ideology and that these differences are
1 Laws are referenced by year, bill number, and house (SB of SF for senate bill
r ﬁle and HB, HF, or AB for house bill or ﬁle or assembly bill). In most cases it is
ossible to use this information to ﬁnd details about the bill at the state legislature’s
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related to differences in the level of support for the bills in state
legislatures.
The background analysis suggests that REEPS laws have become
very controversial in several states and that ALEC has targeted them
for reversal. These bills are portrayed as contrary to conservative
values because they impose government mandates on the economy
and because they may  result in extra cost burdens on residential
and business ratepayers. Therefore, our foundation hypothesis is
the following:
Hypothesis 1. Bills that involve the creation of a new REEPS, the
expansion of the REEPS, or the additional of a solar carve-out to
the REEPS will receive the lowest level of support among REEE
legislation types.
We also note from Table 1 that some types of REEE legisla-
tion have remained relatively well supported even in conservative
states that are dominated by Republican legislatures. These include
laws that mandate efﬁciency standards for government buildings,
which eliminate wasteful government spending, a concern of con-
servatives; and laws that provide tax credits for solar energy and
other renewable energy, because the laws involve tax reductions.
We also hypothesize that REEPS goals (as opposed to mandates)
will be less controversial to conservatives because they are not
mandates [12,20].
Hypothesis 2. Bills that support government building efﬁciency,
enact solar tax credits, or provide for voluntary REEE goals will
receive a relatively higher level of support from legislators in com-
parison with REEPS laws.
We also expect that property-assessed clean energy (PACE) laws
will appear to be consistent with conservative values because they
do not involve government spending. Instead, they authorize bond
issues to enable businesses and homes to purchase solar energy
and energy efﬁciency improvements. However, they do involve an
expansion of the role of government into the ﬁnancing arena, so
they could become controversial to conservatives. Likewise, net
metering appears to be consistent with the conservative frames of
enabling private enterprise and consumer choice, but utilities have
increasingly argued that net metering results in undue burdens on
their revenue streams and causes transfers from other customers
to net metering customers. We  hypothesize that these laws will
receive higher level of support than the REEPS laws. However, we
have broken these two  law types out as a separate hypothesis
because we think the case is less clear-cut that they will be more
highly supported.
Hypothesis 3. Net metering and PACE laws will receive relatively
higher level of support from legislators in comparison with REEPS
laws.
Finally, in the cross-section data set we  had a residual series
of categories that did not match the primary REEE law types indi-
cated in hypotheses 1–3. Thus, we added another hypothesis about
additional categories of laws that support REEE but do not sup-
port a particular type of technology or policy instrument. Because
conservatives are concerned with reducing regulatory burdens on
households and businesses, we reason that the reduction of regu-
lations may  receive relatively higher levels of support than REEPS
laws [20]. Likewise, bills that merely authorize a local government
entity to engage in an activity (such as providing licenses for solar
contractors) would not involve government spending or interven-
tions in the private sector and therefore might receive higher levels
of support in comparison with REEPS laws.
Hypothesis 4. REEE laws that reduce regulatory burdens for
the private sector and households or that authorize government
22 D.J. Hess et al. / Energy Research & Social Science 11 (2016) 19–28
Table  1
“Green Energy” Laws in states with Republican Legislatures, 2013–2014.
Law type State Year Bill Summary House vote Senate vote
Building efﬁciency
FL 2013 SB 1594 Municipalities, schools can enter performance-based contracts for RE and EE 117–0 38–0
MS  2013 H 1266 Newly constructed state buildings meet or exceed ASHRAE standards 118–0 53–0
MS  2013 HB 1281 Requires ASHRAE standards for commercial buildings 115–2 53–0
MS  2013 H 1296 State energy plan with energy efﬁciency goals 116–0 53–0
MS  2014 SB 2521 Authorizes public entities to enter performance-based contracts for RE and EE 122–0 52–0
PA  2014 HB 1672 Authorizes state agencies to test technologies to increase EE 176–16 50–0
TN  2013 HB 794 Creates EE schools council 93–0 32–0
TN  2013 HB 1268 Efﬁciency goals for state buildings 90–0 23–0
TX  2013 SB 533 Improves review process for EE contracts for higher education and government buildings 150–0 30–0
UT  2013 202,310 International energy code for buildings 74–0 24–0
Net  metering
AR 2013 HB 2019 Allows up to four months of net excess generation to carry over at the close of year 91–0 34–0
SC  2014 SB 1189 General solar support, long-term shift to value of solar tariff 105–0 37–0
VA 2013 HB 1695 Net metering added for agricultural customers 94–3 40–0
PACE
AR  2013 SB 640 PACE authorization but not for local governments 51–13 30–5
TX  2013 SB 385 PACE authorization implementation 133–14 30–0
UT  2013 SB 221 PACE authorization 70–3 25–0
Tax  credits
FL 2013 HB 277 Property tax exemption for solar installation 119–0 39–0
NE  2013 LB 104 Tax break for wind farm components 38–2 NA






















sSC  2013 HB 3644 Clean energy tax incentives 
UT  2013 HB 176 Incentives for renewable energy an
VA  2014 SB 409 Expands solar credit from thermal 
ctions will receive higher levels of support in comparison with
EEPS laws.
. Methods and analytic strategy
.1. Overview of the three analyses
The research that follows is based on three analyses that
pproach the relationship of ideology and variation in levels of
upport for types of REEE bills from three different but comple-
entary angles. In all three cases the unit of analysis is the REEE
ill (if passed, the REEE law).
. A qualitative analysis based on 14 semi-structured interviews
with legislators and aides that examines their perspectives on
the different types of REEE laws with respect to conservative
and liberal ideology.
. A longitudinal, quantitative data base of different REEE bill types
that includes the percent “yes” vote in the lower house of the
state legislatures. This is based on a unique data set of 188 passed
laws for the years 2004–2015 for all 50 state legislatures.
. A cross-sectional, quantitative data base of different REEE bill
types that includes both the percent “yes” vote in the lower
house and also failed bills. This is based on a unique data set
of 709 laws and unpassed bills in a stratiﬁed sample of 16 states
for the 2011 and 2012 sessions of state governments.
By using three approaches to the problem of ideology and vari-
tion in support for different types of REEE bills and laws, we are
ble to show convergence across the methods and to develop a
obust, mixed-methods analysis of the underlying research ques-
ion about the importance of ideology in affecting levels of support
or different types of REEE laws.
Although the studies cited in the literature review suggest that
deology is an important factor in determining the odds of adoption
f a REEE bill, our analysis is not designed to evaluate the claim that
deology is the most important factor in gaining greater or lesser
upport for a REEE bill or for the fate of a bill as passed or failed.78–18 34–7
rgy efﬁciency upgrades 68–3 23–0
tric 90–9 40–0
We  do not attempt to predict the odds of adoption of a bill and the
role of ideology in comparison with other factors. Rather, we are
focused on average levels of support for different types of REEE bills
and how those differences in levels of support vary in predictable
ways that are associated with ideology.
3.2. Description of the three data sets
We  use three unique data sets that are the result of over 1500 h
of data gathering. Identifying the laws requires long and tedious
searches through state government databases followed by reading
and analyzing legislative history for each law. Moreover, the inter-
views are the result of approximately four months of tracking down
state legislators.
The ﬁrst data set is based on the semi-structured interviews
with state legislators or their aides. We selected both Republican
and Democratic legislators who had recently sponsored REEE laws.
Selections were made to gain a balance of Democrats and Repub-
licans from different parts of the country. This data set involves
14 interviews of 30 to 190 min  with seven Democratic and seven
Republican legislators from nine different states selected from all
four regions of the country. Five states had complete Republican
control of the legislature, and the other four were either Democrat
controlled or mixed.
The second data set, for the longitudinal analysis, is for the 11-
year period from 2004 to 2014. We chose this period because it
covers rising and declining state-level legislative activity for REEE
and because it covers a period of both Republican (2004–2008) and
Democratic (2009–2014) presidential administrations. During this
period there was  ongoing gridlock in the federal government, and
consequently attention for this policy issue has tended to focus on
state governments.
The third data set, for the cross-sectional analysis, is based on a
stratiﬁed sample of 16 state legislatures from the 2011–2012 ses-
sions. We  chose this time period because it is the most recent for
which we had complete data at the time when we began analy-
sis; it is also of historic interest because it is the ﬁrst complete
session that occurred after the mobilization in 2010 to defeat the
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Table  2
States sampled for the cross-sectional analysis.
Region State Population, 2010 House 2011–12 Senate2011–12 Governor2011–2013
Midwest IA 3,090,416 Dem Rep Rep
IL  12,882,135 Dem Dem Dem
MN  5,420,380 Rep Rep Dem
OH  11,536,504 Rep Rep Rep
Northeast CT  3,596,080 Dem Dem Dem
MA  6,692,824 Dem Dem Dem
MD  5,928,814 Dem Dem Dem
NY  19,378,102 Rep Dem Dem
South FL  18,801,310 Rep Rep Rep
NC  9,848,060 Rep Rep Dem
TX  25,145,561 Rep Rep Rep
VA  8,260,405 Dem Rep Rep
West CA  33,871,648 Dem Dem Dem











































LOR  3,930,065 
WA  6,971,406 
180,662,077(58.5%)
ational cap-and-trade legislation. By this time there was  consid-
rable opposition to REEE policy in state legislatures, especially for
ew or additional REEPS measures. The selection of states was strat-
ﬁed to balance regions and political party dominance. The sample
epresents over half of the country’s population. (See Table 2.) The
tates were selected so that four were from each region of the four
ain regions of the country. States were also selected so that there
as a mixture of party control over the legislatures (some com-
letely controlled by Democrats, some by Republicans, and some
ixed). Before settling on the 16 states, we rejected some states
rom the sample where there were few laws passed or where vote
ecords were unavailable.
.3. Analytical strategy for the ﬁrst data set (semi-structured
nterviews)
Qualitative analysis is used to show that the connections
etween ideology and law type are actually salient as cultural mod-
ls in the minds of state legislators. The interview began with a
iscussion of the recently passed or failed law and the issue of
ipartisan support, then it moved to a discussion about how the
egislator viewed the likelihood of gaining support for different
ypes of REEE laws, with categories used for bill types that follow
he three hypotheses. As the legislators discussed laws, we asked
or reasons, and these prompts usually led to the articulation of
rames that were connected with ideology. We  also asked ques-
ions about which interest groups played the most inﬂuential role
n affecting policies. Although the data analysis for this section does
ot speciﬁcally test the hypotheses, the analysis provides evidence
hat ideological differences are salient in the contrasts among the
ypes of bills.
.4. Analytical strategy for the second data set (longitudinal
nalysis)
The longitudinal analysis examined laws passed in all 50 states
rom 2004 to 2014 that represent the most signiﬁcant legislation
n support of REEE during this period. Because there is no standard
ist of such laws, the selection process occurred by cross-checking
ultiple sources. We  began with the Database of State Incentives
or Renewables and Efﬁciency, then added all major laws iden-
iﬁed from other databases, including the Department of Energy
nd Environmental Protection Agency, PACE Now, the Center for
limate and Energy Solutions, the Home Performance Resource
enter, the American Council for an Energy-Efﬁcient Economy,
ational Conference of State Legislatures, and the Advanced Energy
egislation Tracker. Seven types of REEE laws were included, andTie Dem
Dem Dem
we included only laws that were supportive of REEE. Once laws
were selected, we then found them on the state governments’ leg-
islative bill trackers and searched for details of the bill content and
the legislative history.
Because this analysis was conducted prior to the third analy-
sis, we did not include the variables for the fourth hypothesis. We
included the following laws:
• REEPS (three categories): new standards, changes in standards,
and solar carve-out provisions. New standards are mandates such
as 20% renewable energy by 2025; changes in standards are
included if they are non-trivial, such as an increase in the overall
renewable portfolio standard from 10% to 25% within a desig-
nated time frame; and solar carve-out provisions are included if
they are new authorizations or signiﬁcant increases in existing
standards.
• REEE portfolio goals are voluntary goals for utilities, and they
are classiﬁed separately from REEE portfolio standards because
we reasoned that if ideology played a role, there would be more
support for goals than for standards.
• Government building efﬁciency: establishes energy efﬁciency
standards for state and/or municipal buildings other than schools.
Residences and businesses are not included.
• Net metering: establishes or alters net metering provisions, usu-
ally in a signiﬁcant way such as by increasing the capacity or
subscriber limit or by expanding net metering to new categories
of utilities and customers.
• PACE (Property assessed clean energy) laws: ﬁrst-time authoriza-
tions of residential and/or commercial buildings but not for minor
changes in PACE ﬁnancing or for implementation clariﬁcation.
• Solar tax or fee reduction: tax credit for solar energy generation,
or limit on permitting fees, for homeowners and businesses that
buy photovoltaic systems (can include solar and wind together).
• We  also encountered omnibus REEE bills, which included a vari-
ety of measures. Although we do not have a speciﬁc hypothesis
related to ideology for these bills, we  have included them in the
analysis.
For the dependent variable, we use the percent vote “yes” for the
lower body of each legislature (the “house” or “assembly”) rather
than for the senate because in several states the senate votes were
not available. The average percentage of Democrats and Republi-
cans in the legislature across all laws was  nearly balanced (56%
Democrats). The state legislatures generally do not report on the
vote by political party, only by individual name. Furthermore, in
some states roll-call votes are not available. We did reconstruct this
information for one legislative session in a Democrat-controlled
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tate [20], and we found that the variation in the vote came mainly
rom Republicans, who voted at a rate of 56% for renewable energy
egislation in comparison with 98% for Democrats. Nevertheless,
e recognize that there are conservatives in the Democratic Party,
specially in Southern states, and that even moderates in both par-
ies are attuned to conservative “red ﬂags” in legislation such as
ncreased spending and regulations. Thus, we focus on the overall
ote.
Because of the relatively small size of the data set and our goal
f comparing across types of legislation, we chose to use bivariate
nalyses for this data set.2 As stated in the hypotheses, the bivariate
nalyses compare REEPS changes as the baseline against other laws
ecause this type of law is the best example of a policy instrument
hat conservatives associate with government mandates and liberal
deology. We  used t-tests for unequal variances in comparison with
EEPS changes because the changes were not signiﬁcantly different
rom new REEPS laws and because we could make comparisons
ith the cross-sectional data set, which had no new REEPS laws.3
.5. Analytical strategy for the third data set (cross-sectional
nalysis)
Bills were selected based on a search using the term “energy,”
nd searches with supplementary terms such as solar, wind, and
nergy efﬁciency were conducted to check that we did not miss
ills. Bills were excluded for the following reasons: minor wording
hanges, minor authorizations, general bills with a small section
evoted to energy issues, forms of energy other than REEE (e.g.,
uclear, fossil fuels), transportation (e.g., biofuels, fuel efﬁciency),
ppliance efﬁciency, biofuels unless related to electricity, and oppo-
ition to REEE. In other words, this is a data set comprising the
opulation of bills that were supportive of REEE for the electricity
nd building sectors in the sample of states described above. Bills
ere deﬁned as passed if they passed both houses of the legislature
egardless of a veto or signature by the governor. We  coded both
assed (N = 158) and unpassed (N = 551) bills. At some later point
ome of the unpassed bills might be passed in a future session, so
his data set should be considered a cross-sectional snap-shot.
We attempted to maintain consistency with the categories of
he longitudinal analysis, but there were some changes to the def-
nitions of the same categories:
REEPS change: these changes were often of a more incremen-
tal nature than in the longitudinal data set (such as adding a
qualifying energy source).
Net metering: we included feed-in tariffs and more minor pro-
visions than in the longitudinal data set, such as incremental
inclusions of new types of energy.
We  also had many bills and laws that did not match the set of
ategories in the longitudinal data set. As a result, we added ﬁve
dditional categories that enabled us to capture all of the REEE bills
nd classify them into a category:Authorization: allows a government entity to undertake an action
in support of REEE, usually a local government that is restricted
by a state-government regulation.
2 Event history analysis is not appropriate because it examines causes of ﬁrst
doption.
3 One might argue that the small size of the data set would be better served by
he Wilcoxon ranked sum test. We did perform this test as an additional precaution
nd had equivalent results. Because they are redundant with the t tests for unequal
ariances, they are not reported here.ocial Science 11 (2016) 19–28
• Other building efﬁciency: provides support for energy efﬁciency
measures in schools, and in commercial and residential buildings,
and includes miscellaneous measures to support government
building efﬁciency (includes some tax credits for building efﬁ-
ciency measures).
• Other ﬁnancial incentives: ﬁnancial incentives other than solar
tax credits and fee reductions, including tax credits for geother-
mal  and other renewable energy; grant and loan programs for
REEE; modiﬁcations in the ﬁnancing of PACE programs; business
incentives; and on-bill ﬁnancing programs.
• Reduce regulation: facilitates REEE by reducing regulatory hur-
dles such as for siting and permitting.
• REEE other: requires a study, regulates REEE, establishes a com-
mission, deﬁnes licensing requirements, or modiﬁes greenhouse
gas rules.
As Hypothesis 4 indicates, we only expected to see signiﬁcant
differences from REEPS bills for bills that reduce regulations or that
authorize government action.
We pursued two analytical strategies. The ﬁrst was similar to
the strategy for the longitudinal analysis: the percent yes vote for
all legislators is calculated, and the results are compared with the
REEE standard changes laws in bivariate analyses. This strategy
allows us to compare across the two  analyses and see what level
of consistency exists. In addition, a multivariate analysis was con-
ducted using the dependent binary variable of whether or not a bill
was passed. We  include bipartisan bill sponsorship and state-ﬁxed
effect controls in all models. The ﬁxed effect estimator by state is
most appropriate for this dataset for at least four reasons: (1) we
are interested in estimating the impact of bill characteristics which
vary within states, (2) we want to correct for the bias generated by
correlated unobservables at the state level, (3) the relatively small
number of clusters make it challenging to apply other methods
such as hierarchical linear models, and (4) the states were selected
according to the stratiﬁcation strategy described above. Due to the
binary nature of the dependent variable, the logistic estimator is
most suitable. The state-dummy variable is included in all mod-
els to control for state-level factors that might impact the outcome
variable.
4. Results
4.1. First data set: interviews
The results are discussed by bill type in an order that follows
hypotheses 1–3. The analysis that follows will focus on ﬁve bill
types: REEPS, building efﬁciency, solar tax credits, net metering,
and PACE laws. We  did not discuss voluntary REEE goals in great
detail during the interviews; they were noncontroversial except
from the perspective of liberals, who thought that they were too
weak or ineffective.
4.1.1. REEPS
Although we focused on views of REEPS, we  also included ques-
tions on the perceptions of other mandates such as cap-and-trade
or carbon taxes. In the more conservative states with Republi-
can legislatures, especially in the South, the idea that a legislature
would pass a REEPS, carbon tax (even “fees”), or cap-and-trade
law is a non-starter. For example, with respect to cap-and-trade,
a legislator in Arkansas (Republican) stated, “That is something the
federal government might try to do, but not in this state.” Likewise,
a legislator from South Carolina (Democrat) commented, “Not in
South Carolina. We’re far off from California; that’s another coun-
try,” and a Republican legislator from Utah voiced similar concerns:
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ess, that is a negative here. If you do it by tax credit, or make
t optional, that is okay, but mandates don’t play well up here.”
 Mississippi Republican commented, “Generally, I prefer a mar-
et approach. I think if it is proﬁtable to do it, somebody will do
t. I don’t want to put people at disadvantage, or businesses at a
isadvantage.” Likewise, a South Carolina Republican commented,
Business and industry are opposed to it. The cost gets passed on
o the consumer, and we are not ready to mandate that.” A Repub-
ican from Iowa also questioned the mandates and the problem of
osts: “Energy is cheaper without the mandate. Where do you ﬁnd
he justiﬁcation for that?” In summary, these statements pointed to
he salience of two frames associated with conservative ideology:
nnecessary government mandates and government interventions
n the economy that create unnecessary costs for consumers and
usinesses.
.1.2. Building efﬁciency
We  expected high support for building efﬁciency for govern-
ent buildings because of resonance with the conservative frame
f cutting wasteful government spending, and several legislators
ndicated that it was relatively easy or at least moderately easy
o gain passage for such bills. As a Democrat from South Carolina
ommented, “That’s easy. You save money on future energy use.
t’s smart to do it from the initial buying of the building.” Like-
ise, a Mississippi Republican commented, “We  are all interested
n cutting costs in government, and using energy efﬁciency to do it
akes sense.” However, with respect to efﬁciency for private sec-
or buildings, a Republican legislator from Arkansas stated, “I think
awmakers should carefully study them, so that they aren’t putting
oo much burden on business and industry. Because it is essen-
ially more regulation and more cost.” These comments show that
he positive conservative frame of reducing wasteful government
pending is important in support for building efﬁciency, but when
uilding efﬁciency standards are applied to the private sector, the
rames become negative and shift to mandates and cost burdens.
.1.3. Solar tax credits
We  expected that tax credits would generally appeal to con-
ervatives because they resonate with the conservative frame of
utting taxes. For example, a Republican in the liberal state of Mas-
achusetts commented, “Anything you can do to cut taxes, even tax
redits, will bring a smile to the Republican caucus, and even for a
ot of Democrats.” Likewise, a Democrat in Florida developed a bill
hat prohibited local governments from increasing property taxes
ue to solar installations, and the Republican-controlled legislature
assed it: “It sat well with the Republicans since it is less tax and
hat kind of thing.” The interviews also revealed an additional frame
hat was associated with solar tax credits: business development
nd job creation. As the Republican legislator from Virginia com-
ented: “If a bill creates jobs, or creates investment, that is, if it
enerates economic activity by reducing governmental burdens on
usiness—a jobs bill, a red-tape cutting bill—these are far and away
he most popular bills. Solar has been doing this well. They have
een stressing this—the job creating aspects of solar.”
Although the tax-cutting frame was evident, we found that con-
ervative concerns with balanced budgets and government revenue
empered support for solar tax credits. For example, a Republican
egislator from Arkansas indicated that tax credits were possible
ut only “within reason.” In Virginia, a Republican legislator noted,
We are very wary of tax credits.  . . We  did a study and found many
ax credits on the books, and they were eating away at the bot-
om line of the budget.” A Mississippi Republican commented, “You
on’t want to give away all taxable income, all state revenue. But
omething that encourages people to be more energy efﬁcient and
eek out those energy alternatives, that is better than a mandate.”ocial Science 11 (2016) 19–28 25
Democrats in California and Colorado also pointed to difﬁculties
involved in changing the tax code.
4.1.4. Net metering
With respect to net metering, several legislators, both Republi-
cans and Democrats, mentioned how difﬁcult the issue had become
due to opposition from utilities. We  suggest that the frame of sup-
port for net metering based on enabling consumer choice, which
resonates with conservative ideology, has tended to give way to a
frame of opposition based on an unfair business burden to utilities.
A Republican from Utah explained the utility perspective clearly:
“There is no consideration for the capital investment by utilities
and their investors for transmission lines, getting the power to
your house. Utilities should get a discounted rate because they are
providing the lines connecting it to your home. And it puts other
ratepayers in the penalty box because their rates are going to go
up, because they are paying to compensate for the person who
installed solar or wind and is selling the power through net meter-
ing.” Likewise, a Republican from Iowa commented, “They get full
retail credit for every hour they generate. Who  in their right mind
would think that is close to fair?” A Democrat from Arkansas added
a perspective here on the clash of frames: “It could be easy or hard.
You can make a business argument for it as a do-it-for-yourself, as
an independence thing. . ..and sell it that way to the Republicans.
If it’s not controversial, it would be easy. But if the big utilities are
against it, then it would be hard.”
4.1.5. PACE
We  also expected to see a clash of frames for PACE laws. On
the one side, the conservative frame of a limited government role
in the economy led to opposition. As a Republican from Arkansas
commented, “A lot of people. . .didn’t like it. It’s more government;
it’s more regulation.” Likewise, in Colorado, a state with both strong
liberal and conservative constituencies, the supporters of PACE had
to overcome opposition from banks, which articulated the conser-
vative frame that ﬁnancing of energy improvements for buildings
should be in the private sector. Supporters had to make changes to
appease the banks, and they also brought in conservative business-
people who testiﬁed in favor of the bill by noting that PACE-funded
investments can help businesses hedge future energy costs. So the
advocates had to frame PACE as a pro-business bill that did not
disrupt the terrain of the banks. Likewise, in Utah, a very Repub-
lican state, a Republican legislator commented on how opposition
to PACE legislation was overcome: “There were some people in the
body who thought we  were putting onto municipalities something
that wasn’t their concern; that is, that we  were using public enti-
ties for private ﬁnancing. But I said, no, it’s not that at all. It’s just
a lower interest rate for development. And when they saw it that
way, there wasn’t really opposition after that.”
This comment provides another example of the clash of conser-
vative frames: opposition based on the limited role of government
in the economy and support based on enabling business develop-
ment.
4.1.6. Summary
The qualitative data show that frames associated with politi-
cal ideology—speciﬁcally, limiting the role of government, limiting
government mandates, reducing regulations, reducing cost bur-
dens on consumers and the private sector, and supporting the
needs of the private sector—were important points of reference in
the justiﬁcations that legislators used to support or oppose REEE
legislation. Thus, we  show a pattern of frame utilization that is
consistent with our expectations in hypotheses 1–3.
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Table  3
Major renewable energy and energy efﬁciency laws, 2004–2014.





Government building efﬁciency 32 93**
Net metering 32 95***
Omnibus REEE 28 88*
PACE 24 88
REEE portfolio goal 9 92*
REEE portfolio standard new 11 81
REEE portfolio standard change 22 80
Solar carve-out 10 85
Solar tax credit 20 94***


























S* p < .05.
** p < .01.
*** p < .001, bivariate comparison with REEE portfolio standard change.
.2. Second data set: longitudinal analysis
Table 3 presents the results of the longitudinal analysis. As
ypothesis 1 predicted, the laws that support a REEPS (new, change,
r solar carve out) have the lowest level of support indicated as the
verage percent vote “yes” across the REEPS bills. As hypothesis
 predicted, law types that are most consistent with conservative
deology—government building efﬁciency (cut wasteful spending),
EEE portfolio goals (not mandatory), and solar tax credits (cuts
axes and fees, develops local business)—have a signiﬁcantly higher
evel of support than REEPS change bills. Consistent with hypoth-
sis 3, PACE laws are in between, but the difference from REEPS
hanges is not signiﬁcant (p = .06). However, contrary to our expec-
ation, net metering had a high level of support. We  reason that
ecause many of the net metering laws were passed before the
tilities and ALEC began the campaign against them, they were rel-
tively noncontroversial at the time of passage. Thus, it is possible
hat justiﬁcations based on consumer choice and market develop-
ent were more prominent when these laws were passed.
We also examined the timing of the laws to determine if there
ere changes in levels of support after 2009. In that year Presi-
ent Obama took ofﬁce and began the implementation of his green
obs programs, which in turned triggered a counter-mobilization by
he fossil-fuel sector and political conservatives. The mobilization
as directed especially against proposed federal legislation in sup-
ort of carbon regulation and a national renewable energy portfolio
tandard, but it also included state government policies. Although
able 4
ummary of the cross-sectional dataset of passed and unpassed laws from 2011 to 2012.
Law Type Number of laws passed Numb
Government building efﬁciency 2 9 
Net  metering 15 38 
Omnibus REEE 1 5 
PACE  0 10 
REEPS new 0 0 
REEPS goal 0 0 
REEPS change 23 60 
Solar  carve-out 2 5 
Solar  tax or fee reduction 11 15 
Authorization 18 39 
Other building efﬁciency 18 63 
Other ﬁnancial incentives, credits 8 104 
Reduce regulations on REEE 27 29 
REEE  other (regulations, studies, etc.) 33 174 
Summary 158 (Sum) 551 (S
* p < .05.
** p < .01, bivariate comparison with REEPS (Renewable Portfolio Standard) change.ocial Science 11 (2016) 19–28
one might expect that the level of legislative support for REEE poli-
cies would decline after 2009, we  found that for laws passed in
2010 and later the average level of voting support (88.1%) was only
slightly lower than laws passed between 2004 and 2009 (90.4%).
Likewise, there is no correlation between the year of the law (2004
through 2014) and the percent vote yes (r = − .05). Thus, the overall
pattern of support for REEE laws over time does not show a sharp
drop. However, we  also found that the number of approved laws
peaked in the years 2008 and 2009, that is, at the crest of the broad
political movement in support of green jobs that occurred as part
of the Obama presidential campaign in 2008. There were 28 major
laws passed in 2007, 33 in 2008, and 29 in 2009, then a decline after
that peak.
4.3. Third data set: cross-sectional analysis
The cross-sectional data are presented in Table 4. It is notable
that there were no new REEPS laws or REEE goal laws in this data
set. There were REEPS changes, but these were incremental (adding
a qualiﬁed energy source) rather than major (increasing an over-
all standard percentage level). Overall, the results in Table 4 are
consistent with the longitudinal data in Table 3 and with our three
hypotheses. REEPS laws received the lowest level of support of all
law types (hypothesis 1). Building efﬁciency for government build-
ings and solar carve-outs had high support, but the averages were
only for two  laws in each case (hypothesis 2). Other types of build-
ing efﬁciency laws (for residences, the private sector, and schools)
had an average support level of 89%, both of which were about
average for the data set. These data are consistent with the qualita-
tive data, which suggest that as building efﬁciency laws shift away
from the core conservative concern of reducing government spend-
ing and begin to appear more as mandates on schools, homes, and
businesses, they lose support. Support for solar tax credits or fee
reductions was  high, as in the longitudinal data set, and support for
reduction of regulations to support REEE was  also high. Both of the
latter were signiﬁcantly higher than REEE portfolio changes. Sup-
port for net metering was higher than for REEE portfolio changes,
a ﬁnding that is again consistent with the longitudinal data.
We also computed the ratio of passed to not-passed laws. A ratio
above 1 means that the percentage of passed bills is greater than the
percentage of failed bills. For example, for the net metering laws,
the ratio is (15/158/(38/551) = 1.38. This calculation suggests that
laws that reduce regulations on REEE or that provide a tax credit or
fee reduction for solar have the highest likelihood of passing. Thus,




of all bills passed to

















D.J. Hess et al. / Energy Research & Social Science 11 (2016) 19–28 27
Table  5
Likelihood of a REEE bill passing.




Bipartisan cosponsor (reference level = partisan sponsor) 1.6484*** 1.6934***
(0.2842) (0.2894)
Bill  characteristics
Reduce regulations 1.4416*** 1.4462***
(0.3461) (0.3758)




Net  metering 0.2437 0.2251
(0.3910) (0.4154)
Other  building efﬁciency 0.7260* 0.6935
(0.3439) (0.3725)
Other  ﬁnancial incentives −0.9875*
(0.4494)




Number of observations 667 667


































w* p < .05.
** p < .01.
*** p < .001.
e show that not only do these types of laws gain higher levels of
yes” votes when passed, but they also are more likely to be passed
han other types of laws. The comparison of ratios also suggests that
ills that authorize government action, usually to enable local gov-
rnments to implement REEE projects, also tend to be favored for
assage. In general, the cross-sectional data set is consistent with
he hypothesis that attention to issues that will not trigger con-
ervative ideology objections can help legislators to craft bills that
re more likely to gain bipartisan support. In other words, if leg-
slators cleverly design REEE bills so that they reduce regulations,
educe taxes and fees, and reduce restrictions on local governments
ithout increasing costs, then the bills may  have greater success.
The multivariate analysis shows the odds of a bill being passed,
ith patterns similar to the analysis of the vote ratio. (See Table 5.)
ote that because this is a ﬁxed-effects model, state-level vari-
bles are included as controls, but they are not shown in the table.
n this analysis, bills listed in Table 4 with a small N (passed plus
ot passed) were not included, and REEE Other was not included
ecause we can perfectly predict the last variable given the infor-
ation that the ﬁrst seven bills provided. Reducing regulations,
ranting solar tax credits, and authorizing government action had
he highest levels of signiﬁcance, and ﬁnancial incentives other
han solar tax credits or fee reductions reduced the likelihood of a
ill being passed. These results are consistent with our overall the-
is that bill characteristics that do not trigger concerns with ﬁscal
onservatism can increase support.
. Conclusion
Using three unique data sets (qualitative, longitudinal, and
ross-sectional), we develop the argument that attention to polit-
cal ideology as reﬂected in policy design for REEE bills can affect
he potential for a legislator to gain broader support for the bill. In
ther words, even though there has been some hardening or polar-
zation of positions with respect to REEE policy in the U.S. (and also
n some other countries), there are some ways to mitigate these
deological divisions. We  show how policy instruments associated
ith liberal ideology (e.g., government mandates that cause con-sumer and business burdens) have lower levels of support, and we
show with the qualitative data that the lower levels of support are
associated with political ideology. We  also show that types of legis-
lation that are more consistent with conservative ideology can and
do gain higher levels of support.
Although this study offers an immediate, concrete policy insight
by providing some strategies for legislators and advocates who are
struggling to build consensus for REEE policy reforms, it also makes
a broader contribution to the social studies of environmental and
energy policy reform. Although studies of the conditions affecting
environmental policy adoption have recognized the importance of
ideology, these studies tend to treat ideology as a simple indepen-
dent variable that predicts an attitudinal or policy outcome. Putting
ideology in a black box as a predictor variable has generated insights
into its relative importance as an explanatory factor among the
causes of environmental reform, but the analytic strategy has limi-
tations. First, if one hopes to develop a theory of environmental and
energy reform that has some potential policy implications and that
might serve to guide advocates and policymakers toward effective
policy solutions, then the strategy offers little in the way of concrete
guidance. Second, if one hopes to develop a theoretically more com-
plex approach to the role of ideology in the politics of energy and
environmental policy, it is helpful to break down the concept of
ideology and attach it to more speciﬁc frames.
This study has suggested a way  forward for the combined policy
and theory problem: develop hypotheses that are based on frames
linked to ideology that can be identiﬁed explicitly in political dis-
course and can be linked to differences among types of bills. We
found evidence that an analytical strategy based on frames associ-
ated with ideological differences could provide insight into levels
of support and the potential for political agreement across ideologi-
cal and partisan divisions. The results are broadly convergent across
qualitative and quantitative analyses, and they suggest strategies
that legislators could employ when crafting new bills.
Although the focus of this analysis is limited geographically
and historically, there is some potential for generalization. The
polarization between liberals and conservatives in the U.S. on
environmental and energy issues is part of a broader historical pro-
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ess by which the private sector has built an institutional ﬁeld of
obbyists, public relations ﬁrms, think tanks, political action com-
ittees, and other organizations [33,34]. This institutional ﬁeld
as led to a long-term political shift in the U.S. away from the
iberal-progressive ideologies that dominated the politics of the
id  twentieth century toward neoliberal ideologies that have inﬂu-
nced both parties increasingly since the 1980s. These trends are
articularly salient in the U.S. and in some other Anglophone coun-
ries, such as Canada and Australia, where conservative politicians
ave also opposed the extension and development of green-energy
olicies. However, neoliberal thought has also inﬂuenced the eco-
omics profession and policymakers in a broader range of countries
35–37]. Clearly, there are differences across countries in the
egree to which conservative (or neoliberal) and liberal (or social
emocratic) ideologies are dominant, just as there are signiﬁcant
ifferences across the states in the U.S. Thus, the relationship
mong political ideology, policy design and frames, and energy and
nvironmental policy is likely to be of general interest in a range of
ountries, and there is reason to assume that it will be of increasing
alience in the future.
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